Arthur Nogueira (10/30/1956) is a career diplomat currently at the Brazilian embassy in Hanoi, Vietnam. He is the author of the book ‘Kôssovo: Província ou País?’ (Kosovo: Province or Country?) (FUNAG, 2015).

“Brazil has no conflicts with Albanians”, says Brazilian diplomat

Having worked in Albania and studied Kosovo, diplomat suggests easing the visa regime between Brazil and Kosovo – but says Brazil’s recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign country will come only when both Serbia and Kosovo solve their current diplomatic and legal issues

Vinicius Gorczeski – In 2009, Brazil declared itself against the independence of Kosovo. The country based its decision on the UN resolution 1.244. Why Brazil went against the Brussels-Washington alliance, which recognized Kosovo’s independence?

Arthur Nogueira – First, I would like to thank you for this interview, which shows, once again, the importance of the question of Kosovo for Albanians, Serbs, and the international community. This issue is alive in the international agenda and remains relevant to all interested agents.

It must be said that the decision of not recognizing the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of Kosovo was not taken with the aim of going against anyone. It is a decision based on norms of the Public International Law, on resolutions of the UN’s Security Council, on the UN’s Charter itself, and last but not least, on traditions and values of the Brazilian foreign policy. Not recognizing the UDI is our sovereign and unilateral decision: no country asked Brazil to adopt this or that position, and Brazil’s decision considered only those parameters. Brazil actively cooperates with the European Union and the United States in numerous fields and, sometimes, we have differing interests, which is perfectly natural. But there was no strategic decision of going against one country or a group of countries.

2) VG: By standing on the side of Russia and China, Serbia’s main allies, have Brazil sought alliances for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council – as Brazilian analysts wrote on that occasion?

AN – No. There was no consultation among the three countries mentioned in your question. Brazil has taken its decision based on the Public International Law, on one resolution of the UN’s Security Council, on the UN’s Charter, and on traditions and values of the Brazilian foreign policy, as I said. Among those countries that haven’t recognize the UDI there are countries with which Brazil is very close; the same goes with the group of countries that have recognized the UDI. Russia and China could stand in any one of these groups without affecting the decision Brazil chose.

3) VG: You wrote that the Brazilian diplomatic tradition deplores mechanisms that do not cherish multilateralism – that have led much of the world to recognize the Kosovar sovereignty. Brazil also values self-determination, but when Kosovo did it, Brazil ignored it. How to explain this apparent contradiction?

AN – In my book “Kosovo: Province or Country” I seek to underline the numerous conflicts that involve the issue of Kosovo. That’s not to say they are only historical, ethnic, religious conflicts or one that belongs to the Great Powers. There are also conflicts within the Public International Law, and the question you raise in your question is one of them: how to reconcile self-determination of people and territorial integrity of states?

First, we must recognize the origin of the concept of self-determination, which was developed in the context of decolonization, in the decades following the end of World War II. There, jurists specified that the colonial territories were not part of the territories of the major cities, and therefore it was not necessary to speak of secession or rupture of the territorial integrity of the metropolis. In the next historical moment, the real secessions began; processes in which a state sees a part of its territory disconnected by means generally violent and that drags with it a part of its original population to the interior of a new independent state. The ethical justification invoked for this process was the same as for decolonization: self-determination. But the processes are different, the legal framework is different.

The International law has no clear answer to your question. There are, however, concrete decisions of national actors – courts, among others – and international – Brazil is one of them – which articulate the conditions for the exercise of self-determination, which may or may not lead to secession. In the first group, the Supreme Court of Canada, for example, stipulated that if a country recognizes the existence of a minority within its territory and treats that population in a fair and dignified manner, the right of secession cannot be recognized and therefore the right to declare their independence. The principle of the territorial integrity of the state prevails here. In the second group, countries like Brazil argue that the secession of Kosovo went against rules of international law and that the issue of self-determination of the Albanians within Serbia should be resolved within Serbia itself. Historically, Albanians have never constituted an independent state and, within the former Yugoslavia, have been treated with dignity and respect. Ethnic conflicts and I know there were many of them, should be settled by Serbs and Albanians within the legal, constitutional framework of Yugoslavia / Serbia, possibly with the support, and perhaps even with intermediation, of friendly nations, but without external intervention much less an armed one.

What certainly does not exist in the international law is the right of secession. Thus, self-determination must tread cautiously considering the complexity of the subject, as can be seen in several highly relevant cases around the world. Think of the dozens of minorities who now speak of self-determination and proclaim their intention to separate themselves from the states in which they are inserted. Note that the international community does not jump in support of them. Quite the contrary: countries tend to ask for calm and restraint and to warn that secessions will not be recognized. This is what Brazil does.

4) VG: In Europe, countries such as Greece and Spain are opposed to the independence of Kosovo for obvious reasons – to avoid the fragmentation of their states. Latin American countries, such as Bolivia, Uruguay, Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil, remained opposed to recognizing Kosovo at that time. Was there any consultation among Latin American countries to reject Kosovo’s recognition? Why would the recognition of a country in Eastern Europe be uninteresting for Latin America?

AN – No. Each country made its individual decision and, as you can see, there was no unanimity on the continent. Thus, one cannot speak of a ‘Latin American interest’ related to Kosovo’s issue, in the same way, there was no “European interest” about it either.

5) VG: You wrote that Kosovo’s independence seems irreversible – Serbia, which is keen to keep Kosovo isolated, even signed an agreement toward this direction in Brussels, in 2013. In 2010, the ICJ stated that it did not see Kosovo’s unilateral independence as an affront to international law. Even so, you defend in your work that Brazil should maintain its decision taken in 2008. Why this decision must be maintained and what Brazil seeks with it?

AN – Before answering your question, we need to consider two things. The Brussels Agreement does not contain a Serbian recognition of Kosovo’s independence. If this had happened, or if this were to happen in the future, it would not make sense for Brazil to maintain non-recognition. The second clarification concerns the judgment of the ICJ. What the Court has decided is that the UDI does not violate the International Law. Thus, and this distinction is important, the ICJ has not spoken up on the independence itself, but only on the declaration of independence. In other words, and very briefly, what the ICJ said is that any person or group of people can declare what they want without facing International Law. This is certainly true but does not solve the problem, since the Court did not say anything about the independence of Kosovo.

As I explained above, the two events mentioned in the question have no impact on the Brazilian decision not to recognize the independence of Kosovo. In other words, Brazil maintains its position for the same reasons it has always maintained: respect for international law, United Nations resolutions, its own international values and practices.

Brazil believes and defends that the international order must be based on the sovereign equality of states, in law, in multilateral processes. In the forums of which it is a part and where it operates, this position is consistently defended. This model of international order, known as a liberal or cosmopolitan model, as opposed to the so-called realist model, is, in Brazil’s view, what suits it best. With this, Brazil achieves security, transparency, predictability, a “level playing field” where actors respect each other and where they build a global society in which everyone wins – unlike the realistic order in which the “zero-sum game” prevails, this is, that one must be harmed so that it advances its interests, an antagonistic vision of losers and winners in permanent confrontation. Kosovo is a concrete episode within the liberal Brazilian view on international relations, and our diplomacy would be inconsistent if it recognized Kosovo’s independence under the conditions in which it was declared.

6) VG: Brazil wants to play a universal role in foreign policy. But the country ignores Kosovo – even though Brazil knows it does not have any advantage from Serbia in doing so. Should Brazil become involved with Kosovo if it is to have a relevant role in foreign policy? In your opinion, what could and should be done by Brazil in this regard?

AN – The Brazilian position, which has been highly consistent for decades, is not aimed at gaining advantages from Serbia. It is a general principle of foreign policy, as I explained in the previous answer.

In its liberal vision of international relations, Brazil seeks to influence multilateral processes, where, historically, it has achieved positive results and is highly respected. There is no movement within the Brazilian diplomacy to change this orientation, nor would there be an advantage in doing so. Otherwise, the country would lose credibility and alliances, it would not gain new friends, it would not become wealthier or safer. It is a diplomacy that does not privilege the fireworks, and therefore, the public tends to be, at times, impatient. But the long-term achievements of such a policy are undeniable. Engagement with Kosovo will not bring any significant increase in Brazil’s relevance in the international arena.

In the book I have written I suggest facilitation of individual relations with Kosovo’s people – visa issues and recognition of travel documents, essentially – because – and this is very important – Brazil has no dispute with the Albanians who live in Kosovo. They are hardworking people, living in difficult conditions, in a place where Brazilians can make friends and maybe even businesses, with benefits for both parties.

7) VG: Could you explain why adopting such measures without recognizing the sovereignty of Kosovo? Does not this look like a contradiction – the approach without recognition?

AN – Brazil has no conflicts with Albanians, neither from Albania nor from Kosovo. In fact, many Albanians and their descendants have been living in Brazil for generations (I worked with one of them, Ambassador Italo Zapa, great Brazilian diplomat). Thus, it seemed to me opportune, in the context of the work I presented to the Itamaraty (Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs) years ago on the question of the independence of Kosovo, to suggest measures that would make clear our sympathy for the Albanians of Kosovo, without giving up the principles of our foreign policy. I think they are reasonable measures and could be implemented without great difficulty. I see no contradiction, but complementation.

8) VG: Although Brazil maintains a tradition of waiting for binding decisions by the UN Security Council to come out in order to manifest itself on general issues, experts in Brazil have already written that the country hides in the laws of international law so as not to antagonize nations like Russia or China, in this case, contrary to Kosovo’s sovereignty. But these countries have offices here in Kosovo, unlike Brazil. Would you say that there is a certain ignorance about Kosovo and the Balkans by the Brazilian government? Would this still be one of the reasons why Brazil still avoids a rapprochement with Kosovo?

AN – We have many questions embedded here, so I will answer each briefly.

1. a) Brazil does not hide in the laws of International Law. Brazil actively participates, together with the other states, in the construction of this right, and, in the next stage, respects the work that the country helped build, which is the result of negotiation, consensus and commitment among the participants.
2. b) Brazil does not shy away from countering Russia or China, nor does it seek confrontations. Would it make sense to fear Russia and China and face the United States or Europe? And sometimes the opposite? Or, join all these countries in other circumstances? The international scene is very complex and fluid and thousands of issues – large and small, public and private, political, commercial, financial, cultural, security issues, etc. – are discussed daily in hundreds of multilateral forums. Brazil acts on the basis of the principles I have indicated earlier and sometimes it is found in one group of countries, sometimes in another. I myself participated in international negotiations in which we met in groups different from those mentioned by you in relation to Kosovo.
3. c) Russia and China have offices in Kosovo under the Resolution S / RES / 1244 of 1999. Brazil did not consider it necessary at that time to open a liaison office in Pristina, although it contributed to the peace process with a police contingent.
4. d) The Brazilian government knows the Balkans very well. We have had embassies in almost every country in the region for decades, and the amount of information that the government receives daily from these posts is immense. There is an entire division of the Itamaraty that deals with these and other countries of Eastern Europe. The decision not to recognize the UDI has been meditated by several heads, by various specialists and has been maintained ever since. The reasons for non-recognition owe nothing to a possible ignorance of the government. Note, however, that because the Brazilian government does not recognize the UDI, it does not have the formal and institutional means to relate to Kosovo. The possible approach is with the people of Kosovo, as I have already mentioned.

9) VG: What could Kosovo do to prove to Brazil that an approach would be fruitful and not a setback – in this scenario, should Brazil explain itself to Serbia and its Eastern allies?

AN – For Brazil, Kosovo is a province of Serbia and its diplomatic relations are made through Serbia. By definition, diplomatic relations take place between sovereign governments and Kosovo does not enjoy such status.

As I have already explained, the issue is not limited to advantages and benefits. There was not – and there isn’t – an immediate cost/benefit calculation in bilateral relations. The Brazilian vision is global, the benefit is to build a balanced, fair planetary relationship, with advantages for all.

The rupture of the legal order, of good relations between nations, as occurred in Kosovo, accompanied by immense violence, was a great setback for the Brazilian way of building international relations. The solution to this problem – which can only be found through negotiation between Serbs and Albanians – is the greatest contribution that Kosovo can make to the international order.

10) VG: Despite the non-recognition, the Kosovars love Brazil and its culture. In Brazil, little is known about the country and the region. To facilitate the solution of this impasse that has lasted for several years, it would not be interesting for Brazil to get involved at least in mediating this dispute, instead of maintaining the policy of “there is something to be said about this and that, but nothing about the current situation”?

AN – Brazil will be happy to examine a possible request to cooperate in resolving the problem. Noninterference in foreign affairs is one of the cardinal points of Brazilian foreign policy. In the case of Kosovo, I think there were too many interferences and many of them had agendas that did not facilitate a mutually acceptable solution, quite the opposite. The figure of the ‘honest broker’ begins to have credibility when both parties consider it as such and are not forced to accept it, but choose it of their own free will. If that happens, why not?

11) VG: During and shortly after the global crisis of 2008, Brazil had a good economic moment and enjoyed some international confidence under the acronym of the BRICS. President Lula’s foreign policy was aimed at building global alliances off the Brussels-Washington axis. The government has changed, the BRICs have lost their sparkle and no longer grow as before, Europe isolates more and more Moscow and there is tension in the US relationship with traditional European allies. What global role can Brazil play in this new scenario?

AN – International relations go through different moments and are naturally fluid, as you suggest. Brazil’s role is to navigate through this ever-moving sea. The rules of navigation are always the same and do not change just because the winds are stronger or weaker. What we need to do is to reinforce what we know from experience that works: multilateralism, respect for sovereignties, respect for agreements, respect for UN resolutions, respect for the just order, for international court decisions, respect for searching major problems’ solutions, such as human rights, disarmament, the environment, etc. Brazil is one of the founders of the United Nations, and before that, it was a member of the League of Nations. Our history shows that Brazilian foreign policy is coherent and works with the same values ​​and seeking the same results decade after decade. If in recent years, the international economic and trade scenario has become stormier, the right path is to continue building common, non-protectionist solutions to overcome the crisis and resume growth. It may seem time-consuming, but it works and offers the most solid and enduring answers. Brazil’s contribution is to try to convince even the most impatient ones that this is still the best way to proceed.